Europe is now on its own

Opinion: After the attempted assassination of Donald Trump, all eyes were on the Republican National Convention. Though Trump’s formal nomination as the GOP’s presidential candidate was a foregone conclusion, his choice of running mate raised eyebrows: JD Vance, the author of Hillbilly Elegy.
Vance’s selection concludes quite a political journey. Once a “never-Trumper”, Vance has morphed into an arch-Trumpist. But from a European perspective, his nomination signifies more than a stunning political transformation. It is a harbinger of tough times to come for trans-Atlantic relations.
Vance, a staunch isolationist, has openly advocated for reducing US involvement in European security affairs. His advocacy for a “dormant Nato” in which the US would serve merely as an offshore “balancer of last resort” represents a radical departure from decades of trans-Atlantic security cooperation. For European leaders, this should be setting off alarm bells.
Yet given this alarming development, Europe appears woefully unprepared for the potential seismic shift in US foreign policy that a second Trump term could bring. This lack of readiness raises a puzzling question: why has Europe failed to significantly bolster its defence capabilities and reduce its dependence on American security guarantees, despite years of clear warning signs?
The puzzle becomes even more perplexing when we consider the series of events that should have spurred Europe into action. Trump’s initial term from 2016 to 2020 provided a stark preview of what an ‘America First’ foreign policy could mean for Europe. His scepticism towards Nato, transactional approach to diplomacy, and criticism of European defence spending were clear indicators that the post-World War II security arrangement could no longer be taken for granted.
In November 2020, as Joe Biden secured his victory over Trump, a cautious optimism rippled across European capitals. As I wrote for Newsroom back then (Defrosting the trans-Atlantic relationship, November 17, 2020), it seemed the “trans-Atlantic Ice Age” might be thawing, potentially heralding a return to more predictable relations between Europe and the US.
In retrospect, even such moderate optimism appears to have been misplaced. More crucially, it seems to have lulled Europeans into a false sense of security, leading to a puzzling lack of action in preparing for future geopolitical uncertainties.
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should have shattered any remaining complacency. But instead of a rapid and comprehensive overhaul of European defence capabilities, little has fundamentally changed in Europe’s security situation.
Despite rhetorical commitments to Ukraine’s defence, Europe’s material support has lagged behind the US’, highlighting its limited capacity for sustained military engagement. The war has made it abundantly clear what Europe should prepare for, yet the response has been remarkably muted.
Several factors may contribute to this puzzling inaction. Institutional inertia within the EU and Nato structures, designed for stability, is paradoxically hindering rapid adaptation to new geopolitical realities. Economic constraints, exacerbated by the lingering effects of the pandemic, are making many European countries reluctant to significantly increase defence spending. Political fragmentation and the rise of populist movements in some countries are impeding a cohesive European response.
Moreover, decades of relative peace and US security guarantees have eroded Europe’s capacity for independent strategic thinking. There seems to be a persistent, and wishful, belief that US foreign policy will inevitably revert to its post-World War II norm, regardless of election outcomes.
The implications of this inaction are profound and troubling. Europe now faces the prospect of a potential second Trump term from a position of continued vulnerability. Where Trump’s first term was characterised by bluster and threats, a second term is likely to see concrete action. Nato’s existence could be at stake, leaving Europe exposed to an increasingly aggressive Russia.
Europe’s options for addressing this security deficit are limited and fraught with challenges. The prospect of a European nuclear deterrent – whether through a new EU-wide programme or an expansion of French and British capabilities – is a non-starter (Europe’s impossible nuclear option, February 7, 2024). The political, technological, and financial hurdles are simply too high to overcome in the short to medium term.
Conventional forces fare little better. Despite the wake-up call of the Ukraine war, European militaries remain underfunded and ill-equipped for large-scale conflict. The spectre of reintroducing conscription looms over a continent that had thought such measures consigned to history (Europe will not be able to fight the return of conscription, April 30, 2024). Yet even this drastic step would take years to meaningfully enhance Europe’s defensive capabilities, but the real military shortage lies in equipment and ammunition.
The tragedy of Europe’s current predicament is that it was entirely foreseeable. The four years of the Biden presidency should have been used to build resilience, enhance military capabilities, and forge a more cohesive European defence strategy. Instead, they were largely wasted, with many European leaders reverting to old habits of free-riding on American security guarantees.
Now, as the 2024 US election approaches, Europe finds itself in a state of vulnerability reminiscent of the early Cold War years – but without the assurance of unwavering American support. The continent faces the very real prospect of having to confront Russian aggression with insufficient military capabilities and a fragmented political will.
And now Europe may not just have to deal with Trump but with Vance, too. Vance’s nomination as Trump’s running mate is emblematic of a broader shift in American politics. It reflects the deep-seated changes in the Republican Party’s foreign policy outlook.
The selection of Vance also highlights the widening gulf between American and European perspectives on global security. While Europe continues to operate under post-Cold War assumptions, figures like Vance represent a fundamentally different worldview that sees little inherent value in traditional alliances.
As Europe grapples with this new reality, it faces not just a military readiness challenge but a conceptual one. The continent must come to terms with a world where long-held certainties about the trans-Atlantic relationship no longer apply. Europe is now on its own.
Whether Europe’s political and institutional structures can adapt to this new paradigm remains an open question.
If Europeans thought dealing with Trump was tough, dealing with a Vice President (and possible future President) JD Vance will be even more challenging.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is Chief Economist with the New Zealand Initiative, a business-funded think-tank. Its members are listed on its website here